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We compute the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of global restrictions on labour
mobility using a multiregional CGE model. A distinctive feature of our analysis is the introduction
of a segmented labour market, as two types of labour are considered: skilled and unskilled.
According to our results, when labour is a homogeneous factor, the elimination of global
restrictions on labour mobility generates world-wide efficiency gains that could be of considerable
magnitude. When the labour market is segmented and both skilled and unskilled labour migrate,
welfare gains reduce since the benefits and losses of migration are not evenly distributed within
each region. When only skilled labour migrates, the world-wide efficiency gains are smaller, since
this type of labour represents a small fraction of the labour force in developing regions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The classic economic argument in favour of labour migration is that people move in search of
higher wages, hence increasing their own productivity.
1 However, as indicated by Layard et al.
(1992), the decision to migrate also depends upon other economic, social and political
considerations. Among the economic aspects, migrants may take into account comparative wage
levels (actual and expected); comparative unemployment rates and unemployment benefits; the
availability of housing; and the cost of migration which includes travel expenses, information costs,
and the psychological cost of leaving friends and family. Weyerbrock (1995) also indicates that
political instability and civil war may cause larger emigration flows than economic or demographic
pressures.
Recent empirical studies on international migration have mainly focused on U.S.-Mexico
migration patterns (Hill and Méndez, 1984, Robinson et al., 1993; Levy and van Wijnbergen, 1994),
and migration flows from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into Western Europe
(Layard et al., 1992; Weyerbrock,1995).
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) has been the only attempt to quantify the efficiency gains
from the removal of global restrictions on labour mobility. They use a partial equilibrium
framework, in which the parameters of a CES production function are estimated for a seven-region
country classification. Then, the estimated parameters are used to calculate the changes in labour
allocation across regions after the removal of immigration controls. They assume that the world-
wide labour supply is fixed, that full employment occurs in all regions, and that differences in
labour’s marginal product across regions arise from barriers to inward mobility of labour in high
wage countries. Hamilton and Whalley find large efficiency gains from the removal of immigration
controls; in most cases, these gains exceed world-wide GNP generated in the presence of the
controls. In addition, in labour exporting regions wage rates rise and capital owners are made worse
                                                                
1 Layard et al. (1992) indicate that free trade and international capital mobility can also raise productivity,
without labour migration.2
off; on the other hand, in labour receiving regions wage rates fall and capital owners are made better
off.
In this paper we compute the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of
restrictions on labour mobility. In contrast to Hamilton and Whalley (1984), we use a multiregional
general equilibrium model instead of a partial equilibrium approach, since the former provides an
ideal framework to analyse the effects of policy changes on resource allocation, the structure of
distribution, and thus in economic welfare. A distinctive feature of our analysis is that we consider a
segmented labour market (i.e., skilled and unskilled labour), which can be justified on the grounds
that this factor is not homogeneous. The segmentation of the labour market jointly with the general
equilibrium framework allow us to examine the distributional effects of migration between skilled
and unskilled labour in each region, and between these two and capital.
According to our results, the elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility generates
world-wide efficiency gains that could be of considerable magnitude, ranging from 15% to 67% of
world GDP. With the introduction of a segmented labour market, welfare gains reduce since the
benefits and losses of migration are not evenly distributed within each country, ranging from 13%
to 59% of world GDP. And when only skilled labour migrates, world-wide efficiency gains are
smaller ranging from 3% to 11% of world GDP, since skilled labour represents a small fraction of
the labour force in developing regions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of our multiregional
general equilibrium model. Section 3 contains the empirical implementation, including the
description of the benchmark data set and the calibration of the model. Section 4 presents the results
of the model as well as the sensitivity analysis. Section 5 presents model elaborations, including
transaction costs, international capital mobility, and selective mobility. Section 6 offers some
concluding remarks.3
2. THE MODEL
In a world economy characterised by countries with different levels of income, individuals have
incentives to migrate to countries with higher wage rates. If labour were allowed to move from one
country to another without restrictions, it will do so until the marginal product of labour is the same
in both low income and high income countries. Migration will reduce the labour force in the low
income country (source region), leading to an increase in wages,
2 and a reduction in the demand for
labour. In addition, migration leads to a process of factor reallocation within the poor country: the
remaining workers gain through higher wages, but capital owners lose since labour is now scarce
relative to capital. Conversely, in the high income country (destination region) the labour force
increases, which leads to a reduction in the wage rate (assuming no rigidities). This lower wage will
increase the demand for labour and aggregate employment. During the transition, workers will lose
through lower wages and capital owners will gain since labour is now less scarce relative to capital
(see e.g. Bhagwati et al., 1998; Layard et al. 1992). This analysis is based on the assumption that
labour is a homogeneous factor of production, which implies that the benefits and loses of migration
are evenly distributed within each country. However, as our analysis will show later on, this is not
necessarily the case when there are many types of labour.
3
                                                                
2 The magnitude of the increase will depend on the elasticity of labour demand. The more elastic the demand
for labour, the smaller the increase in wages.
3 For some trade theorists the issue of the removal of restrictions on labour mobility may not be of great
relevance because of the factor price equalisation theorem, according to which factor prices will be equalised
by free trade without internationally mobile factors (see Samuelson 1948, 1949). However, this theorem is
based on very restrictive assumptions, such as identical technologies in different countries, constant returns to
scale, perfect competition, no factor intensity reversals, no specialisation, and that good prices are equalised
as a result of trade. Moreover, factor price equalisation depends on the complete convergence of the price of
the goods. In reality, the prices of the goods are not fully equalised because of both natural (e.g.,
transportation costs) and artificial barriers to trade (e.g., import tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export
restraints). An additional reason why factor price equalisation may not be achieved is that countries exhibit
different technologies and resources, so that they are unlikely to remain unspecialised (see e.g. Layard and
Walters 1978, Krugman and Obstfeld 1994).4
2.1 STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The structure of the model follows the standard specification of a multiregional general equilibrium
model. The model is static, and consists of eight regions, each one with demand and production
structures, linked through trade. Each region contains one industry that produces a single output,
which is treated as heterogeneous across regions (Armington, 1969). There is a representative
consumer in each region and, for simplicity, intermediate production is not considered.
On the production side we consider two variants. In the first variant, production involves a
CES value added function with capital (K) and labour (L) as primary inputs; factor demands are
obtained from cost minimisation. In the second variant of the model, we consider capital (K) and
two types of labour: skilled (Ls) and unskilled (Lu). In other words, the labour market is assumed to
be segmented and this, as indicated above, is a distinctive feature of our modelling exercise in
comparison to previous work by Hamilton and Whalley (1984). Figure 1 presents the production
structure of the model, when the labour market is segmented.












The model uses two-stage CES production functions, which are more flexible since they
allow us to have different elasticity parameters in each stage of the production process. In the first
stage, Ls and Lu are combined to produce the aggregate labour input (L); that is,
) 1 /(
r r r r r r
r r
r / ) 1 r ( r / ) 1 r (






￿ p - + p f =
V - V V - V
, r = 1, …,8, [1]
where L
r is the aggregate labour input used in region r; Ls
r and Lu
r are skilled and unskilled labour
inputs in region r; f
r is a constant defining units of measurement; p
r is a share parameter; V
r is the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour in the production of the good in
region r.
Labour demand functions for the two types of labour are obtained from cost minimisation;
that is, each industry selects an optimal level of Ls and Lu that minimise the cost of producing L
units of the aggregate input.
In the second stage the aggregate labour input and capital are combined to produce value
added. In each region the industry selects an optimal level of inputs that minimises the cost of
producing value added. Further, the commodity produced in each region can be transformed either
into a commodity sold on the domestic market, or into an export according to a constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function. Then, exports are allocated across regions according to a sub CET
function.
Factors are non-produced commodities in fixed supply in each region. Factors of production
are assumed to be internationally immobile, although this assumption is relaxed later on for Ls.
Turning to the demand side of the model, we assume that consumers within a region have
identical homothetic preferences, which allows us to consider a representative consumer, endowed
with all the labour and capital in the region. In this case, as there is only one good, the region’s
representative consumer demands a composite of domestically produced and imported goods
subject to the region’s budget constraint. Figure 2 presents the demand structure of the model.6











region’s income is derived from ownership of factors of production, government transfers and the
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where PLu,r, PLs,r, and PK,r define the selling prices of the factors of production in region r;  Lu
r ,
Ls
r , and  K
r  correspond to the region’s endowment of unskilled labour, skilled labour, and
capital, respectively; TR
r represents transfers from the government; and TB
r corresponds to the
region’s trade surplus (or deficit). On the other hand, the region’s expenditure includes the amount
spent on goods as well as taxes paid:
r r
r
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where I
r corresponds to the region’s income, Pi is the price paid by the consumer in region r, and T
r
corresponds to taxes paid by the consumer in region r.
The model also incorporates trade and domestic tax policies. These include income, factor
and consumption taxes, as well as import tariffs, all of which are modelled in ad valorem form. All
tax revenues raised are assumed to be transferred back to consumers.
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that some of the assumptions of the model may affect the
outcome of the simulations. In global models it is usually assumed that capital is internationally7
immobile. This assumption may not be very realistic since international capital markets are
becoming more integrated. However, this assumption is fundamental to the structure of the model;
if all factors of production are allowed to move freely, the concept of region is no longer clear.
Hence the need for a fixed factor in the specification of the model (in one of the extensions of the
model, when capital is assumed to be internationally mobile,
 unskilled labour is the fixed factor in
the model)
4.
Regarding labour, in the model it is assumed that differences in the marginal product of
labour arise from barriers to inward mobility of labour in high-wage countries. Thus, once barriers
to labour mobility are eliminated wage rates equalise across regions. The model also assumes that
labour in one region is the same as labour in another region, so that differences in labour quality or
human capital per worker across countries are ignored. In the real world these differences are not
only present but may also be significant. For example, Lucas (1995) indicates that production per
worker in the US is about fifteen times what it is in India; after correcting for differences in human
capital, each American worker was estimated to be the equivalent of about five Indian workers.
Another important factor that may affect labour productivity is the technology available in each
region. Thus, the elimination of restrictions on labour mobility may not after all eliminate
differences in productivity across regions. As can be seen, some of the assumptions used in the
specification of the labour market may be highly simplified; however, incorporating differences in
the quality of labour across regions is severely constrained by data availability.
2.2. EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS OF THE MODEL
Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. Equilibrium in the
model is given by a set of goods and factor prices for which all markets clear. That is, demand-
                                                                
4 Instead of having a fixed factor, a nontradable good could be introduced, so that all production factors could
be inter-regionally mobile.8
supply equalities hold in each goods and factors markets; zero profit conditions hold for each
industry in each region; and each region is in external-sector balance.
In the goods market, gross output equals final demand because intermediate production is
netted out; specifically, the model has the following blocks of market clearing conditions:
•  The supply of goods for domestic consumption must equal the demand for domestically
produced goods.
•  Exports from region r to region s must equal imports of region s from region r, because there
are assumed to be no transfer (e.g. transport) costs in shipping goods from one region to
another.
•  Total supply of composite commodities, which consists of the composite of similar domestic
products and aggregate imports, must equal consumer’s demand in each region.
  When labour is assumed to be heterogeneous, there is an additional market clearing
condition, which states that the supply of the aggregate labour input generated by the combination
of Lu and Ls, must equal the demand for the aggregate labour input used in the production of value
added.
  As to the equilibrium conditions in the factor markets, we initially assume that all factors
are internationally immobile. This assumption implies that factor prices are different in each region;
this is an important assumption for the results of our model, since market clearing conditions in
factor markets determine factor prices. Under this assumption, we have separate labour and capital
equilibrium conditions in each region. That is, the region’s endowment of capital and labour must
equal factor use (i.e. full employment occurs in all regions). In the second variant of the model
capital is assumed to be internationally mobile. This assumption implies that there is only one price
for capital in the model, and this is determined by the market clearing condition that factor use
across all industries and regions must equal the world endowment of capital.
  The zero profit conditions state that the total value of sales must equal the industry’s costs,
they must hold in each region. In particular,9
•  In each region the value of domestic output must be equal to the capital and labour costs of
producing the good. At the same time, the value of domestic output equals the value of
commodities sold in the domestic market plus the value of commodities sold as exports.
•  The value of commodities sold as exports must equal the value of the sum of exports to the
other 7 regions.
•  The value of total imports must equal the value of the sum of imports from the other 7 regions.
•  The value of the composite commodity demanded by consumers must equal the value of
aggregate imports plus the value of domestically produced goods.
•  The value of goods sold for domestic consumption must be equal to the value of the demand for
domestically produced goods.
•  The value of exports from region r to region s must be equal to the value of imports of region s
from region r.
  Once again, when considering heterogeneous labour it is necessary to introduce an
additional zero profit condition, that the value of the aggregate labour input must be equal to the
skilled and unskilled labour costs of producing the aggregate input.
  Finally, the external sector balance condition indicates that each region is always on its
budget constraint. In this case, we assume that in each region the value of exports minus the value
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r P is the benchmark consumer price (this price is equal to 1),  TB
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0  is
the benchmark trade surplus (or deficit), and the term in parentheses is a Paasche price index. We
use this price index to take into account changes in prices in the new equilibrium.
                                                                
5 We do not have a zero trade balance, since this involves adjusting the data.10
  Once the equilibrium conditions that characterise the model have been specified, we
proceed to compare counterfactual equilibria with the benchmark equilibrium generated by the data.
However, before doing this, we calculate the parameters of the model that are consistent with the
benchmark data set; these parameters allow us to reproduce the data set as an equilibrium solution
of the model.
 
  3. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
  The model consists of eight regions, each of which engages in domestic and foreign trade activities.
These regions were chosen to reflect world trade, and we use 1990 data for the United States
(USA), Japan (JAP), the European Union (12-member-EU), other development countries (ODC),
developing America (DAM), developing Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS), and developing
Europe (DE).
6  Table 1 presents the grouping of individual countries.
  We assume that each region produces one commodity, and that each region’s domestically
produced and imported goods are qualitatively different (Armington, 1969). We consider one
commodity as our analysis focuses on the efficiency gains from the elimination of restrictions on
labour mobility. The introduction of a segmented labour market is a very important feature of our
model, so that we consider two types of labour: skilled and unskilled. This characteristic allows as
to analyse the distributional effects that the migration of skilled labour has on unskilled labour,
since the assumption of homogeneous labour implies that the benefits and losses of migration are
evenly distributed within each region. Lastly, the price of the composite commodity demanded by
the consumer in USA is chosen as the numeraire.
 
 
                                                                
6 Initially, developing Oceania (which included Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
and Vanuatu) was included as a ninth region. At the time of solving the model we encountered numerical
problems because this region was very small compared to the others (in 1990 its GDP accounted for only
0.2% of world GDP). Hence, it was excluded from the analysis.11
  3.1. BENCHMARK DATA SET
  The benchmark data set involves domestic activity data and external sector data for each region in
1990. Domestic activity data involve data on value added by component, the segmentation of the
labour market as well as domestic taxes. External sector data includes data on foreign trade and
import tariffs.
  The size of the eight regions is given by their respective GDP in 1990 US dollars,
consistent with the World Tables (1995). The benchmark data set satisfies the equilibrium
conditions of the model in the presence of the existing policies. We use data from National
Accounts as compiled by the United Nations, World Tables produced by the World Bank, and the
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund. Regarding foreign
trade statistics, we use information from UNCTAD (1995) and the GATT-trade policy review for
various countries.
  The data set used was based on a data set previously assembled by the author, in which
each region produced three goods, namely primary commodities, manufactured goods, and services.
For the purpose of this paper, these three goods were aggregated into a single commodity. We use
information from (various issues of) the Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the International Labour
Office (ILO) to calculate the percentages of skilled and unskilled labour in each region; the
following percentages were obtained:
7
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
  Ls   30.2%   17.4%   20.6%   25.5%   15.7%   14.3%   9.1%   13.5%
  Lu   69.8%   82.6%   79.4%   74.5%   84.3%   85.7%   90.9%   86.5%
 
                                                                
7 An appendix with the sources and the procedure followed to assemble the data set is available from the
author upon request.12
  As can be seen, these percentages indicate that more than 17% of the labour force in
developed regions is skilled, while in developing regions this percentage is less than 16%. National
Accounts, from which the wage bill is taken, reports the remuneration of employees without
distinguishing between types of labour. The percentages reported above are therefore important
since they are used to split the wage bill into remuneration to skilled and unskilled labour in each
region. The resulting wage bills are (figures in $ billions):
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
  Ls   999.8   281.0   643.5   297.7   61.4   10.2   48.6   110.6
  Lu   2,313.8   1,330.8   2,473.0   871.7   330.2   60.8   485.8   706.8
 
  Once we have assembled the data set, some parameter values such as share parameters and
scale parameters, can be directly calculated from the equilibrium conditions of the model, following
the procedure described in Mansur and Whalley (1984). Because of the functional forms used in the
model, we need to specify parameter values for the elasticities of substitution and transformation
that are not contained in the data set. Once these parameters have been specified, share parameters
can be obtained from demand functions. On the supply side, share and scale parameters can be
obtained from cost functions.
 
  3.2. ELASTICITIES
  The key elasticities in our model are the skilled-unskilled labour substitution elasticity, as well as
the elasticity of substitution between capital and the aggregate labour input. The degree of
substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour determines the change in relative wages once a
policy change is introduced. On the demand side of the model, the most important are the
elasticities controlling substitution between import types in forming import composites, and those
controlling substitution between comparable domestic goods and aggregate imports.13
  The majority of studies on labour-labour substitution use a disaggregation by occupation to
separate the labour force; in particular, the disaggregation most widely used is between production
and non-production workers, because of data availability. There does not seem to be consensus as to
an approximate value for the labour-labour substitution elasticity, and this is reflected by the fact
that there is a rather large range of variation in the elasticity estimates, from 0.14 to 7.5
(Hamermesh and Grant 1979).
8  The big differences in the elasticity estimates can be the result of
major methodological differences, such as the choice of estimating a cost or a production function,
the choice of functional forms, the choice of data (time-series versus cross-section), and the
disaggregation of the labour force according to various criteria, among others. The estimate of the
elasticity of substitution between non-production-production workers was chosen as proxy for the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour. We use a value of 0.9 in our central
case, and this value is used for all regions, since estimates for each region were not available.
Sensitivity analysis is performed around the value chosen in the range 0.5 to 2.5.
9
  In the case of the value added functions, the key parameters are the CES elasticities of
substitution between the aggregate labour input and capital.
10 We use elasticities of factor
substitution based on those used by Whalley (1985). Because of the lack of detailed regional data
our elasticities are almost identical across regions.
  On the demand side of the model, two different types of elasticities are involved with the
CES forms used: those controlling substitution between import types in forming import composites,
and those controlling substitution between comparable domestic goods and aggregate imports. In
this model, elasticities of substitution in consumption are not needed because each representative
                                                                
8 Hamermesh (1993), however, points out that the substitution relationship between production and non-
production workers tells us little about the substitution between high- and low-skilled workers because
“…there is a remarkably large overlap in the earnings of these two groups” (p. 65).
9 It was also tried to use elasticity values greater than 2.5, but we encountered numerical problems when
solving the model.
10 Whalley (1985) points out that there is no consensus as to the quantitative orders of magnitude involved,
since most time-series estimates of the aggregate substitution elasticity are in the neighbourhood of unity, and
cross-section estimates are often around 0.5.14
consumer demands one good only, which is a composite of comparable domestic and imported
(composite) goods.
  Regarding trade elasticities, the most important are import-price elasticities and export-
price elasticities. Substitution elasticities between import types making up any composite determine
the export-price elasticities faced by regions. Substitution elasticities between import composites
and comparable domestic products reflect import-price elasticity estimates in the literature, since it
was not possible to find any econometric estimate of elasticities of substitution. The elasticities used
in the model (central case) are presented in Table 2.
 
  3.3. CALIBRATION
  Once the data set has been assembled, and elasticity parameters have been specified, share and scale
parameters can be calculated from the equilibrium conditions of the model, following the procedure
described in Mansur and Whalley (1984).
  The benchmark data set provides information on equilibrium transactions in value terms.
The first step of the calibration procedure involves the separation of these transactions into price
and quantity observations. In order to do this, a units convention is widely used, in which it is
assumed that a physical unit of each good and factor is the amount that sells for one dollar. That is,
both goods and factors have a price of unity in the benchmark equilibrium.
  However, this approach is not applicable in the case of the labour market, because we
assume different marginal products of labour, resulting from barriers to inward mobility of labour in
high-wage countries (that is, wages are different from one). In addition, we consider two types of
labour, skilled and unskilled, each one with a different productivity and, as a result, a different price
within each region.
  There is no agreement as to how to calculate the average wage rate. Hence, we consider six
alternative measures, which are the most widely used. First, we use the wage bill  for each region
(WB), as taken from National Accounts, and divide it by total population (TOTP), as taken from the15
UN Demographic Yearbook. Total population, however, exceeds the workforce in each region.
Therefore, we use as a second measure of the average wage rate the wage bill divided by the
economically active population (EAP).
11  The third and fourth measures use GDP per capita using
TOTP and EAP, respectively. The fifth and sixth measures of the average wage rate use GDP per
capita using TOTP and EAP, where the GDP has been adjusted by the exchange rate deviation
index, that corrects for the difference between the official and the purchasing power parity exchange
rates (AGDPpc) (Kravis et al., 1982). The wage measures based on GDP per capita were included
for comparison purposes, since Hamilton and Whalley (1984) used this measure in their
calculations. However, GDP per capita in only an approximate measure of average wages as it is a
measure of economic activity, and not a measure of income. Furthermore, in the production of
domestic output labour is not the only factor of production involved; physical capital and human
capital are also involved. From GDPpc it is not possible to isolate the labour component. Table 3
reports the relative wage rates calculated using the six alternatives mentioned above. Regardless of
how the wage rates are calculated, USA, JAP, EU and ODC have higher wage rates than the
developing world (i.e. DAM, DAF, DAS and DE).
  When there is labour market segmentation, we need to calculate the average wage rates of
skilled and unskilled labour in each region. Given that in practice such data are not available, we
use average earnings per worker in finance, insurance, real state and business services as proxy for
skilled labour wages, while average earnings per worker in wholesale and retail trade, restaurants
and hotels as proxy for unskilled labour wages. The ratio between high and low wages is then used
to infer the average wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour in each region.
12 The resulting
relative wage rates for the two types of labour are reported in Table 4.
                                                                
11 ILO (1996; p.5) defines the economically active population as “…all persons of either sex who furnish the
supply of labour for the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference period”.
12 An appendix with the procedure followed to calculate average wage rates is available from the author upon
request.16
  The final step in the calibration procedure is to use the price-quantity data to calculate
parameters for demand and production functions from the benchmark equilibrium observations,
given the required values of pre-specified parameters such as elasticities and tax rates. In order to do
this, we use the equilibrium conditions together with first-order conditions (from utility
maximisation and cost minimisation), to solve for function parameter values using equilibrium
prices and quantities. Calibration allows us to test the solution procedure, and ensures the
consistency of agents’ behaviour with the benchmark data set. The model was solved using a
routine we wrote in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software.
 
  4. MODEL RESULTS
  The model described above was used to calculate the world-wide efficiency gains from free
mobility of labour (the results are presented for the six measures of wages mentioned above). We
consider two scenarios: in the first one labour is a homogeneous factor of production, while in the
second one labour is classified as skilled and unskilled. In the latter scenario, we consider two
cases: a) both skilled and unskilled labour migrate; and b) skilled labour is the only factor that
migrates. We did not consider the case where unskilled labour is the only factor that migrates since
this is not a realistic case, given the actual international restrictions on labour mobility. The model
does not consider illegal migration.
  The removal of restrictions on labour mobility modifies the market clearing condition that
determines the equilibrium wage rate. In particular, when labour is homogeneous the equilibrium
condition is given by








r L L , [5]
  where 
r L corresponds to the region’s endowment of labour. In the heterogeneous case we have
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  where 
r Ls corresponds to the region’s endowment of skilled labour.
  In the model international capital transfers are not considered, since it is assumed that
migrant workers do not bring capital with them nor send capital back home. Capital flows and
transfers may alleviate the negative effects of migration on wages. In addition, the model assumes
that all migrant labour enter the labour market (some migrants such as children and elderly people
will not actually work).
  Once immigration controls are removed, labour migrates from low-wage regions to high-
wage regions. The source regions are DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE, while the destination regions are
USA, JAP, EU, and ODC. However, when the average wage rate is measured as wage bill divided
by EAP, and wage bill divided by TOTP, DE becomes a destination region for the homogeneous
labour case. When labour is heterogeneous, and both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, DE
becomes a destination region for unskilled labour, and a source region for skilled labour. Regardless
of whether labour is homogeneous or heterogeneous, the amount of the factor entering DE is not
considerable.
  Table 5 quantifies the effects of the removal of immigration controls on welfare, as
measured by the aggregate equivalent variation.
13 In the homogeneous labour case, there is a
reduction in production in all sectors in the source regions. This is accompanied by a reduction in
exports and an increase in imports which compensate for the reduction in domestic output.
Conversely, in the destination regions, there is an increase in production in all sectors accompanied
by an increase in exports and a reduction in imports from developing regions. In this case, there are
large gains from the removal of global immigration controls, ranging from 15% to 67% of world
GDP. These gains are not as large as those obtained by Hamilton and Whalley (1984), where in
some cases the gains exceeded the world-wide economy GNP. The differences may be the result of
                                                                
13 The equivalent variation (EV) is a measure of welfare change. It is defined as the amount of money a
particular change, that has taken place between equilibria, is equivalent to. In this case, an arithmetic sum of
EVs, summed across regions is used.18
the modelling frameworks (i.e. partial equilibrium versus general equilibrium), the flows of labour
leaving low-wage regions, or units of measurement as Hamilton and Whalley (1984) use
population, and we use units of labour.
  Table 5 also presents the welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls when
labour is a heterogeneous factor. In this case, as in the previous scenario with homogeneous labour,
there is an increase in domestic output in developed regions, whereas output reduces in developing
countries; the reduction in domestic output is compensated by a reduction in exports and an increase
in imports from developed regions. When both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, efficiency
gains range from 13% to 59% of world GDP. The gains are smaller than in the homogeneous case
as a result of the technological constraint imposed by the substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labour. Thus, with a segmented labour market skilled and unskilled labour have less
opportunity to reallocate. When only skilled labour migrates, world-wide welfare gains are much
smaller than in the previous two cases (from 3% to 11% of world GDP) because skilled labour
represents a small fraction of the labour force in the source regions (i.e. 14% in DAM, 10% in DAF,
5% in DAS, and 14% in DE).
  The segmentation of the labour market also allows us to examine the distributional effects
of immigration between skilled and unskilled labour in each region. Tables 6 to 8 present the
distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls for the six measures of wages
considered. A priori one would expect that labour migration from the source regions increases the
labour supply in the destination regions, reducing the average wage rate (assuming no rigidities),
and benefiting capital owners. In the source regions, the removal of immigration controls is
expected to reduce the labour supply, increasing the average wage rate. As a result, capital is less
scarce relative to labour, so that a reduction in the return to capital is expected.
  In the case of homogeneous labour, capital owners in the destination regions indeed benefit
from migration, despite the fact that for some regions the average wage rate increases (in these19
cases, the return to capital increases even more). In the source regions workers are better off as a
result of migration and capital owners lose (Table 6).
  Let us now consider the case of heterogeneous labour (see Tables 7 and 8). When both
skilled and unskilled labour migrate, average wages increase in the source regions because labour is
less abundant relative to capital, and the return to capital decreases. The removal of immigration
controls benefits skilled labour more than unskilled labour, because the former is a small proportion
of the total labour force, and after migration this factor is more scarce in developing regions. In the
destination regions average wages reduce for both skilled and unskilled labour, since labour is now
less scarce relative to capital, and the return to capital increases.
  When only skilled labour migrates, there is a substantial increase in the remuneration of this
type of labour in the source regions, since this factor of production is not abundant in these regions.
Unskilled workers and capital owners are worse off as a result of migration, despite the fact that
there is an increase in their remuneration. As to the destination regions, the inflow of skilled labour
increase the supply of this type of labour, hence reducing its average wage rate. As we would
expect, the average wage of unskilled labour and the return to capital increase. Skilled labour is
worse off.. The flexibility of wages allows the labour market to absorb labour immigration. Lower
wages induce an increase in labour demand and in aggregate employment.
  The amount of labour leaving the source regions varies depending on the measure used to
calculate average wages. For example, when these are measured as the wage bill divided by TOTP,
53% of the labour endowment of developing regions migrate to developed regions; when the
average wage rate is measured as adjusted GDP per capita using EAP, this percentage reduces to
37%. On the other hand, when both skilled and unskilled labour migrate in the heterogeneous
labour case, the percentage of labour leaving the source regions varies from 35% (average wage rate
measured as adjusted GDP per capita using EAP) to 50% (average wage rate measured as the wage
bill divided by TOTP). When only skilled labour migrates, between 59% and 73% of the skilled20
labour endowment of developing regions migrate, depending on how the average wage rate is
calculated.
  In summary, migration leads to factor reallocation, and during this process there are
winners and losers. In the source regions, labour becomes more scarce relative to capital (between
37% and 53% of the labour endowment of developing regions migrate to developed regions,
depending on the wage measure used), and capital owners lose. However, not all workers are better
off, since labour is a heterogeneous factor. Emigration will benefit workers whose skills are
substitute to those of migrant labour, whereas it will hurt those workers whose skills are
complementary to those of migrant workers. On the other hand, in the destination regions, labour
becomes more abundant (less scarce) relative to capital, so that capital owners benefit. However,
not all workers are worse off, because labour is a heterogeneous factor. Immigration will benefit
those workers whose skills are complementary to those of the immigrant worker, whereas
immigration will hurt those workers whose skills are substitute to those of immigrant workers.
  We also performed a sensitivity analysis on the key elasticities of the model.
14 In particular,
in a first set of simulations the elasticity of labour-labour substitution was varied from 0.5 to 2.5.
This elasticity is very important in our model since it includes a segmented labour market, a feature
that has not been considered in previous works. In a second set of simulations, the elasticities of
substitution in the production of value added were set at values between 0.5 and 1.5 in all regions.
When labour is homogeneous, this substitution elasticity corresponds to the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour; when labour is heterogeneous, it corresponds to the elasticity of
substitution between the aggregate labour input and capital. We conclude that the results are robust
to the elasticity choice, in the sense that the elimination of immigration controls generates world-
wide efficiency gains. In addition, in the destination regions capital owners benefit from labour
immigration, and workers lose because of lower wages. In the source regions, capital owners are
                                                                
14 The results are not reported here, but are available from the author upon request.21
worse off and workers are better off. When the labour market is segmented, the sensitivity analysis
also confirms that migration of skilled labour hurts unskilled labour in the source regions.
 
  5. MODEL EXTENSIONS
  This section introduces three new features to the model: a) transaction costs; b) international capital
mobility; and c) selective labour mobility. For brevity we only report the results of two out of the
six measures of average wages considered: average wage rate as measured by the wage bill divided
by TOTP, and as adjusted GDP per capita using EAP. These two measures were chosen as they
provided the extreme results.
 
  5.1. TRANSACTION COSTS
  The first elaboration of the model is the introduction of transaction costs. This extension of the
model seems appropriate, since migration is a costly process. There are costs involved in the
process of moving from one region to another, such as transport costs, the costs of settling in other
region, the costs of finding a new job, and the costs of leaving friends and family behind. With the
elimination of restrictions on labour mobility, labour will move until the marginal product of labour
equals the cost of hiring labour. However, in the presence of transaction costs, wages fail to equalise
across regions; hence, a single market clearing wage no longer characterises the equilibrium.
Transaction costs thus drive a wedge between wages in developed and developing countries.
Migration flows reduce compared to the case without transaction costs.
  Transaction costs were modelled as a tax (without revenue), whose rate is exogenously
determined. The price received by owners of labour in each region corresponds to a percentage of
the market clearing price when restrictions to labour mobility are eliminated. That is, the price of
labour in each region is given by,
 P W TC L
r r = - ( ) 1 , [7]22
  where W corresponds to the world price of labour, and TC
r corresponds to regional transaction
costs.
  Transaction costs are difficult to quantify since there are no measures available. As
mentioned earlier, there are costs associated with migration from low-wage to high-wage regions. In
the case of developing regions, these costs could be very high. Taking into account the substantial
differences in relative wages among the regions, we assume the following values for transaction
costs: 0.9 for DAF and DAS; 0.8 for DAM; and 0.7 for DE. The transaction costs for developed
regions (USA, JAP, EU, and ODC) are assumed to be much smaller (i.e. 0.1), since workers in
these regions have little or no incentive to move to low-wage regions.
  The introduction of transaction costs reduces migration flows (see Table 9). For example,
when the average wage is measure as the wage bill divided by TOTP, and labour is homogeneous,
migration reduces from 44% of the world endowment of labour to 20%. In the heterogeneous labour
scenario, migration reduces from 41% of the world endowment of labour to 27% when the two
types of labour are allowed to migrate, and from 51% of the world endowment of labour to 37%
when only skilled labour migrates.
  The welfare gains as a result of the removal of immigration controls are smaller in the
presence of transaction costs (see Table 10). Regarding the distributional effects, the main
conclusions remain unaltered. That is, labour benefits (loses) relative to capital in the source
(destination) regions. When the labour market is segmented, skilled labour benefits relative to
unskilled labour in the source regions; in the destination regions the two types of labour lose, but
unskilled workers are hurt even more when both skilled and unskilled labour migrate.
  Finally, migration and welfare gains increase as the transaction costs for the developing
regions are reduced (these results are not reported here). This is the case since transaction costs
distort the labour market, specially in developing regions, and as the distortion is reduced,
efficiency increases and the wage gap reduces.
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  5.2. CAPITAL MOBILITY
  In the second elaboration of the model we introduce international capital mobility. Although this
feature is usually ignored in global models (see e.g., Whalley, 1985; Shoven and Whalley, 1992), it
seems interesting to include it in the model since capital markets are becoming more integrated
internationally. In this case, the return to capital equalises across regions. Therefore, a single market
clearing rental rate characterises the equilibrium; that is, the market clearing condition for the
market of the capital factor is given by,








r K K , [8]
  that is the sum of the demand for capital in each region must equal the global endowment of the
factor.
  Simulations were carried out for the scenario in which we have heterogeneous labour and
only skilled labour migrates, since we need a fixed factor (in this case unskilled labour). If all
factors of production are allowed to move freely, the concept of region is no longer clear.
  When we remove the restrictions to skilled labour mobility, we observe that labour moves
from regions with low wages (DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE) to regions with high wages (USA, JAP,
EU, and ODC). Capital moves from regions where it is abundant relative to labour (USA, JAP, EU,
and ODC) to regions where it is scarce relative to labour (DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE). The effects
over the remuneration of the factors of production are similar to those obtained when capital is not
internationally mobile. We observe a substantial increase in the remuneration of skilled labour in
the source regions, since this factor is not abundant in these regions, whereas unskilled labour and
capital owners are worse off; in the destination regions, the remuneration of skilled labour falls and
unskilled labour and capital owners are better off (see Table 11). The effects of capital mobility on
the return to capital are smaller than the effects of skilled labour mobility on wages. This is
explained by the fact that capital flows from developed to developing regions are smaller than
labour flows from developing to developed regions. In particular, when wages are measured as the24
wage bill divided by TOTP, migration flows account for 56% of the world endowment of labour
whereas capital flows account for only 7% of the world endowment of capital.
  In addition, aggregate welfare improves compared with the scenario without capital
mobility (see Table 12). The improved welfare is the result of a better resource allocation with
smaller distributional effects.
  The previous results should be taken with caution since they are ruled by the specification
of the capital market. That is, since we assume a competitive market, capital will respond to
variations in its rate of return. However, as indicated by Layard et al (1992), developing regions
have low productivity, and it is possible that migration from DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE to USA,




  5.3. SELECTIVE LABOUR MOBILITY
  The third elaboration of the model is the introduction of selective labour mobility. This extension
seems interesting since some countries have signed bilateral agreements with other countries that
cover project-link work, seasonal work, work in border areas, and guest workers.
16 We focus on the
case where individuals in some particular regions in the developing world are allowed to migrate to
developed regions. We consider the following seven possibilities:
•  Workers in DAM migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
•  Workers in DAF migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
•  Workers in DAS migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
•  Workers in DE migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
•  Workers in DAM migrate to USA.
                                                                
15 Lucas (1995) provides an alternative explanation.
16 For example, Germany have signed labour agreements with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.
Also Belgium, France and Switzerland have signed labour agreements with East European countries
(Weyerbrock, 1995)25
•  Workers in DAS migrate to JAP.
•  Workers in DAF and DE migrate to EU.
  Each of these seven possibilities are analysed when labour is homogeneous, when labour is
heterogeneous and both skilled and unskilled workers migrate, and when labour is heterogeneous
and only skilled workers migrate.
  Under this elaboration, the average wage equalises across the regions involved, whereas
each of the excluded regions will have a market clearing condition for the labour market.
  We observe an aggregate welfare improvement in all seven cases (see Table 13). The
magnitude of the welfare gains depends on the size of the source region in terms of the labour
market endowment. In particular, the highest welfare gains are obtained when workers in DAS are
allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC, since DAS is the most densely populated region,
and has one of the lowest average wages. Conversely, the lowest welfare gains are obtained when
DE is allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC; this result is not surprising since DE is the
third region in terms of population in the developing world, and the region’s average wages are, in
some cases, the highest in then developing world.
  In terms of the amount of labour that moves between regions, the largest movement occurs
when workers in DAS are allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC. In the homogeneous
case, the proportion of labour that moves out of DAS varies between 13% and 30% of the world
endowment of labour; in the heterogeneous labour case, the proportion of labour that moves out of
DAS varies between 12% and 36% of the world endowment of labour. Conversely, the smallest
amount of migration occurs when the workforce in DE is allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and
ODC. These results suggest a positive relationship between the amount of migration and welfare
gains.
  As to the distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls, results not reported
here indicate that the introduction of selective labour mobility does not affect our main conclusions
in the homogeneous labour case (i.e. workers in the source region and capital owners in the26
destination regions benefit from migration). However, the magnitude of the distributional effects
tend to be smaller in the destination regions, and larger in the source regions.
  Let us now consider the heterogeneous labour case with skilled and unskilled labour
migration. To begin with, when workers in DAM migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC, skilled
labour in ODC also migrates to the other developed regions because the remuneration of this factor
is the lowest of the developed world.
17 Skilled and unskilled labour are better off relative to capital
in the source regions, and in DAM unskilled labour is better off relative to skilled labour. This
result contrasts with the findings in the central case, and can be explained by the fact that more
unskilled labour is migrating out of the region. In the other selective labour mobility cases, skilled
labour is better off relative to unskilled labour and capital in the source regions, whereas in the
destination regions unskilled labour is worse off relative to skilled labour, and capitalists benefit.
  Lastly, when we have a segmented labour market and skilled labour migration, skilled
workers gain in the source regions relative to unskilled workers; in the destination regions, both
unskilled and skilled labour lose relative to capital, although unskilled labour loses less than skilled
labour.
 
  6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  In this paper we have computed the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of restrictions
on labour mobility. One of the key features of our model is the introduction of a segmented labour
market, as we consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled. When labour is heterogeneous,
we consider the cases where both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, and when only skilled labour
migrates. In our analysis, wages differ across regions because of the existence of barriers to labour
mobility, and wage rates are equalised as a result of the elimination of restrictions to labour
mobility rather than free trade.
                                                                
17 ODC also becomes a source of skilled labour when only workers in DAF, and only workers in DE are
allowed to migrate to the developed world.27
  Our findings indicate that the elimination of global restrictions to labour mobility generates
world-wide efficiency gains, that could be of considerable magnitude, ranging from 15% to 67% of
world GDP. When only skilled labour is allowed to migrate welfare gains are smaller, since skilled
labour is a small proportion of the labour force in developing regions; in this case, efficiency gains
range from 3% to 11% of world GDP.
  Migration also leads to a process of factor reallocation in which there are winners and
losers. In the source regions, labour becomes more scarce relative to capital, and capital owners
lose. However, not all workers are better off, since labour is a heterogeneous factor. Emigration will
benefit workers whose skills are substitute to those of migrant labour, whereas it will hurt those
workers whose skills are complementary to those of migrant workers. On the other hand, in the
destination regions, labour becomes more abundant (less scarce) relative to capital, and capital
owners benefit. Again, not all workers in the destination regions are worse off, because labour is a
heterogeneous factor. Immigration will benefit those workers whose skills are complementary to
those of the immigrant worker, whereas immigration will hurt those workers whose skills are
substitute to those of immigrant workers.
  The model was then extended by including: a) transportation costs, since migration is a
costly process; b) capital mobility, since capital markets have become more international in scope;
and c) selective labour mobility, since some countries have introduced immigration control policies
that allow migration flows from some regions and not from others.
  With the introduction of transaction costs, wages fail to equalise across regions, migration
flows reduce and in consequence efficiency gains reduce as well. With capital mobility, the return
to capital equalises across regions; the removal of restrictions to skilled labour mobility makes
labour move out of the regions with low average wages, and capital moves out of the regions where
it is abundant relative to labour. Global welfare improves compared with the scenario without
capital mobility, as a result of a better resource allocation and migrants benefit as well. With
selective labour mobility, aggregate welfare improves, and the magnitude of the gain depends on28
the size of the region in terms of the labour endowment. As to distributional effects, labour benefits
in the source regions, and capital in the destination regions. With a segmented labour market, skill
labour benefits from migration relative to unskilled labour in the source regions.
  Finally, our results have shown that the elimination of global restrictions to labour mobility
generates considerable world-wide efficiency gains. Despite these gains, the liberalisation of world-
wide migration is far from realistic because of social and political tensions. High-income countries
are very reluctant to open their borders to free migration because they do not want to become the
destination of immigration of unskilled labour from low-income countries. In the short-run,
countries regulate the flows of international migration by means of border controls, and work
permits, among others. In the long-run, countries should concentrate their efforts in the elimination
of the incentives to migrate, which could be accomplished by reducing income disparities among
regions.29
  Table 1: Regional classification
  Region 1:   United States      
  USA        
  Region 2:   Japan      
  JAP        
  Region 3:   Belgium      Denmark   France   Germany
  EU   Greece       Ireland   Italy   Luxembourg
    Netherlands       Portugal   Spain   United Kingdom
  Region 4:   Australia       Austria   Canada   Finland
  ODC   Iceland       Israel   New Zealand   Norway
    South Africa       Sweden   Switzerland
  Region 5:   Antigua & Barbuda   Argentina   Barbados   Belize
  DAM   Bolivia       Brazil   Chile   Colombia
    Costa Rica       Dominica   Dominican Rep.   Ecuador
    El Salvador       Grenada   Guatemala   Guyana
    Haiti       Honduras   Jamaica   Mexico
    Nicaragua       Panama   Paraguay   Peru
    St. Lucia       St.Kits & Nevis   Suriname   Uruguay
    Trinidad & Tobago    Venezuela   St. Vincent & the Grenadines
  Region 6:   Algeria       Angola   Benin   Botswana
  DAF   Burkina Faso       Burundi   Cameroon   Cape Verde
    Central African Rep.  Chad   Comoros   Congo
    Cote d’Ivoire       Djibouti   Egypt   Equatorial Guinea
    Ethiopia       Gabon   Gambia   Ghana
    Guinea       Guinea-Bissau   Kenya   Lesotho
    Madagascar       Malawi   Mali   Mauritania
    Mauritius       Morocco   Mozambique   Namibia
    Niger        Nigeria   Reunion   Rwanda
    Sao Tome & Principe  Senegal   Seychelles   Sierra Leone
    Sudan        Swaziland   Togo   Tunisia
    Uganda        Tanzania   Zambia   Zimbabwe
  Region 7:   Bahrain        Bhutan   Bangladesh   China
  DAS   Hong Kong        India   Indonesia   Iran (Islamic Rep)
    Jordan        Kuwait   Laos   Lebanon
    Malaysia        Mongolia   Myanmar   Nepal
    Oman        Pakistan   Philippines   Qatar
    Rep. of Korea        Saudi Arabia   Singapore   Sri Lanka
    Syrian Arab Rep.        Taiwan   Thailand   Yemen
    United Arab Emirates    
  Region 8:   Bulgaria        Croatia   Cyprus   Czech Rep.
  DE   Estonia        Hungary   Malta   Poland
    Romania        Slovenia   Turkey   USSR (former)
    Yugoslavia (former)    30
  Table 2: Elasticities in the model
 
  Elast.   USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
  V   0.900   0.900   0.900   0.900   0.900   0.900   0.900   0.900
  s   0.830   0.800   0.820   0.840   0.850   0.860   0.840   0.840
  p   0.920   0.930   0.859   0.948   1.263   1.019   1.546   2.715
  z   0.990   0.930   0.919   1.130   0.544   0.572   1.227   1.410
 
  Notes:
  V is the labour-labour substitution elasticity.
  s is the elasticity of substitution between capital and the aggregate labour input; based on estimates
presented in Whalley (1985).
  u is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. The values used are based
on import price elasticities. For USA and JAP the source is Marquez (1990). For EU we use an
average of the elasticities of Germany and the United Kingdom (Marquez, 1990); France, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands (Stern et. al., 1976); and Portugal
(Houthakker and Magee, 1969). For ODC we use an average of the elasticities of Canada (Marquez,
1990); Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand (Stern et. al.,
1976). For DAM we use an average of the elasticities of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay (Khan, 1974). For DAF we use an average of the elasticities of
Ghana and Morocco (Khan, 1974). For DAS we use an average of the elasticities of India, the
Philippines and Sri Lanka (Khan, 1974); and Pakistan and Bangladesh (Nguyen and Bhuyan, 1977).
For DE we use the elasticity for Turkey estimated by Khan (1974).
  z is the elasticity of substitution between regional imports. The values used are b ased on export
price elasticities. For USA and JAP the source is Marqez (1990). For EU we use an average of the
elasticities of Germany and the United Kingdom (Marquez, 1990); France, Belgium-Luxembourg,
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands (Stern et. al., 1976); and Portugal (Houthakker and
Magee, 1969). For ODC we use an average of the elasticities of Canada (Marquez, 1990); Austria,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand (Stern et. al., 1976). For DAM
we use an average of the elasticities of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
and Peru (Khan, 1974). For DAF we use an average of the elasticities of Ghana and Morocco
(Khan, 1974). For DAS we use an average of the elasticities of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka (Nguyen and Bhuyan, 1977). For DE we use the elasticity for Turkey estimated by Khan
(1974).31
 
Table 3: Relative wage rates – Homogeneous labour
(1990 US$)
Wage Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/TOTP 100.0 98.4 68.3 72.8 7.0 1.0 1.5 13.2
WB/EAP 75.1 78.2 60.0 61.4 7.4 1.0 1.5 10.8
GDPpc(TOTP) 34.9 52.1 27.0 25.3 4.3 1.0 0.9 4.9
GDPpc(EAP) 26.2 38.6 23.7 21.4 4.6 1.0 0.9 4.0
AGDPpc(TOTP) 17.5 28.7 13.4 12.5 4.1 1.0 1.2 3.7
AGDPpc(EAP) 13.1 21.2 11.8 10.6 4.4 1.0 1.2 3.032
 
 
Table 4: Relative wage rates – Heterogeneous labour
(1990 US$)
Wage Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/TOTP
Unskilled labour 91.3 96.3 60.2 72.9 6.7 1.0 1.5 13.8
Skilled labour 150.0 158.1 122.2 97.6 13.1 1.8 2.2 17.3
WB/EAP
Unskilled labour 68.5 71.3 52.9 61.6 7.1 1.0 1.6 11.3
Skilled labour 112.6 117.0 107.5 82.4 13.8 1.8 2.3 14.1
GDPpc(TOTP)
Unskilled labour 31.9 51.0 23.8 25.4 4.2 1.0 0.9 5.1
Skilled labour 52.4 83.7 48.3 33.9 8.1 1.8 1.3 6.4
GDPpc(EAP)
Unskilled labour 23.9 37.7 20.9 21.4 4.4 1.0 1.0 4.2
Skilled labour 39.3 62.0 42.5 28.6 8.6 1.8 1.4 5.2
AGDPpc(TOTP)
Unskilled labour 16.0 28.1 11.8 12.6 4.0 1.0 1.2 3.8
Skilled labour 26.2 46.1 23.9 16.8 7.7 1.8 1.8 4.8
AGDPpc(EAP)
Unskilled labour 12.0 20.8 10.4 10.6 4.2 1.0 1.3 3.1
Skilled labour 19.7 34.1 21.1 14.2 8.2 1.8 1.8 3.933
  Table 5: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls
  (Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
 
    Homogeneous   Heterogeneous Labour
    Labour   Both Ls and Lu
   Migrate
  Only Ls
   Migrates
  WB/TOTP   67   59   11
  WB/EAP   54   48   9
  GDPpc TOTP)   45   41   8
  GDPpc(EAP)   36   32   7
  AGDPpc(TOTP)   19   17   4
  AGDPpc (EAP)   15   13   3
 
  Notes:
  Ls and Lu denote skilled and unskilled labour, respectively.34
  Table 6: Distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls
  Homogeneous labour
  (% change)
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
                 
  WB/TOTP                
  PL   -44   -43   -18   -24   697   5,459   3,731   322
  PK   227   280   208   188   498   1,485   1,008   357
                 
  WB/EAP                
  PL   -37   -35   -21   -23   539   4,629   3,040   338
  PK   171   214   165   150   395   1,255   853   341
                 
  GDPpc(TOTP)                
  PL   -31   -53   -10   -4   457   2,324   2,652   397
  PK   135   178   135   130   337   688   743   360
                 
  GDPpc(EAP)                
  PL   -24   -48   -16   -7   334   1,896   2,095   337
  PK   98   126   100   98   253   556   606   300
                 
  AGDPpc(TOTP)                
  PL   -15   -48   12   19   261   1,393   1,179   308
  PK   53   54   76   73   195   411   383   263
                 
  AGDPpc(EAP)                
  PL   -11   -45   -0   11   168   1,072   871   292
  PK   37   30   50   51   131   313   291   237
 
  Notes:
  PL corresponds to the average wage rate and PK refers to the return to capital.
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  Table 7: Distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls
  Heterogeneous labour – Both skilled and unskilled labour migrate
  (% change)
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
                 
  WB / TOTP                
  PLS   -18   -22   0   26   837   6,671   5,446   608
  PLU   -47   -50   -20   -34   620   4,697   3,022   249
  PK   191   236   181   164   263   1,351   900   329
                 
  WB / EAP                
  PLS   -12   -15   -7   21   619   5,377   4,246   604
  PLU   -40   -43   -23   -34   478   3,981   2,467   263
  PK   145   179   142   129   363   1,130   755   312
                 
  GDP pc (TOTP)                
  PLS   -7   -42   1   43   499   2,580   3,535   662
  PLU   -34   -59   -12   -17   406   2,005   2,161   313
  PK   113   146   116   113   308   615   655   328
                 
  GDP pc (EAP)                
  PLS   -3   -39   -10   33   343   1,998   2,654   631
  PLU   -28   -54   -17   -19   294   1,633   1,701   317
  PK   83   100   85   85   229   494   529   307
                 
  AGDP pc (TOTP)                
  PLS   -0   -43   9   56   238   1,342   1,374   446
  PLU   -17   -53   12   5   234   1,220   969   245
  PK   44   38   66   63   174   364   332   234
                 
  AGDP pc (EAP)                
  PLS   1   -42   -6   40   143   993   982   407
  PLU   -13   -50   0   -2   149   942   716   234
  PK   31   17   42   43   115   250   250   210
 
  Notes:
  PLS corresponds to the average wage rate of skilled labour; PLU is the average wage rate of
unskilled labour; and PK refers to the return to capital.36
  Table 8: Distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls
  Heterogeneous labour – Only skilled labour migrates
  (% change)
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
                 
  WB / TOTP                
  PLS   -60   -62   -51   -38   361   2,234   2,631   249
  PLU   24   55   48   40   117   217   189   129
  PK   27   60   51   42   115   211   184   128
                 
  WB / EAP                
  PLS   -52   -54   -50   -35   289   2,862   2,250   281
  PLU   19   46   39   34   97   190   164   129
  PK   22   41   42   36   96   185   160   128
                 
  GDP pc (TOTP)                
  PLS   -46   -66   -41   -16   250   1,464   2,022   345
  PLU   16   35   35   34   86   116   146   139
  PK   18   39   37   35   85   113   143   138
                 
  GDP pc (EAP)                
  PLS   -38   -61   -43   -15   183   1,239   1,657   366
  PLU   13   25   26   27   67   97   121   135
  PK   14   28   28   28   66   94   118   134
                 
  AGDP pc (TOTP)                
  PLS   -27   -59   -20   14   147   954   978   299
  PLU   8   9   23   26   54   76   78   111
  PK   9   12   24   27   53   74   76   109
                 
  AGDP pc (EAP)                
  PLS   -21   -54   -26   10   91   761   752   299
  PLU   6   3   14   19   37   58   59   102
  PK   7   4   15   20   36   56   57   101
  Notes:
  PLS corresponds to the average wage rate of skilled labour; PLU is the average wage rate of
unskilled labour; and PK refers to the return to capital.37
 
  Table 9: Migration flows in the presence of transaction costs
  (Migration as a percentage of world’s labour endowment)
 
    Homogeneous   Heterogeneous Labour
    Labour   Both Ls and Lu
   Migrate
  Only Ls
   migrates
       
  Without transaction costs    
  WB / TOTP   44   41   51
  AGDP pc (EAP)   20   19   22
       
  With transaction costs      
  WB / TOTP   30   27   34







  Table 10: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls
  in the presence of transaction costs
  (Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
 
    Homogeneous   Heterogeneous Labour
    Labour   Both Ls and Lu
   Migrate
  Only Ls
   migrates
       
  Without transaction costs    
  WB/TOTP   67   59   11
  AGDPpc(EAP)   15   13   3
       
  With transaction costs      
  WB/TOTP   31   26   6
  AGDPpc(EAP)   1   1   1
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  Table 11: Distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls in the
  presence of capital mobility
  (% change)
 
    USA   JAP   EU   ODC   DAM   DAF   DAS   DE
                 
  WB / TOTP                
  PLS   -62   -64   -54   -42   332   3,018   2,454   226
  PLU   14   29   28   24   69   136   131   76
  PK   48   48   48   48   48   48   48   48
                 
  AGDPpc(EAP)                
  PLS   -24   -56   -29   5   82   720   712   280
  PLU   3   1   7   11   20   37   40   57





  Table 12: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls
  in the presence of capital mobility




  Wage measures
  Only Ls
   Migrates
   
  Without capital mobility  
  WB / TOTP   11
  AGDP pc (EAP)   3
   
  With capital mobility  
  WB / TOTP   13
  AGDP pc (EAP)   4
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  Table 13: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls in the presence of selective
mobility
  (Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
 
 
  Migration Scenarios
  Homogeneous
  Labour
  Heterogeneous Labour
      Both Ls and Lu
   Migrate
  Only Ls
   migrates
  DAMﬁUSA, JAP, EU, ODC      
•  WB / TOTP   5   5   2
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   1   1   1
       
  DAFﬁUSA, JAP, EU, ODC      
•  WB / TOTP   11   11   3
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   2   2   1
       
  DASﬁUSA, JAP, EU, ODC      
•  WB / TOTP   47   52   9
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   11   11   2
       
  DEﬁUSA, JAP, EU, ODC      
•  WB / TOTP   3   3   1
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   2   2   1
       
  DAMﬁUSA      
•  WB / TOTP   4   4   1
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   0   0   0
       
  DASﬁ JAP      
•  WB / TOTP   15   24   4
•  AGDPpc(EAP)   7   9   2
       
  DAF, DEﬁEU      
•  WB / TOTP   10   11   3
•  AGDPpc(EAP) 3 3 1
Note:
ﬁ indicates the direction of the migration flow.40
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